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There is a big gap between theory and practice in quantum key distribution (QKD) because real
devices do not satisfy the assumptions required by the security proofs. Here, we close this gap by
introducing a simple and practical measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD type of protocol,
based on the transmission of coherent light, for which we prove its security against any possible
device imperfection and/or side-channel at the transmitters’ side. Besides using a much simpler
experimental set-up and source characterization with only one single parameter, we show that the
performance of the protocol is comparable to other MDI-QKD type of protocols which disregard
the effect of several side-channels.
Introduction.—Recent years have witnessed a tremen-
dous progress in the field of quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) [1–3], which includes the realization of
long-distance fiber-based implementations [4–6], satellite
links [7–9], and the deployment of QKD networks [10–12].
Despite these groundbreaking results, however, the secu-
rity of QKD implementations has not been fully estab-
lished yet, due to the difficulty of real devices to satisfy
the assumptions required by the security proofs.
To bridge this pressing gap between theory and
practice in QKD, various approaches have been pro-
posed [13–16], being measurement-device-independent
(MDI) QKD [16] probably the most promising one, as it
can remove all assumptions about the measurement unit,
arguably the Achilles’ heel of QKD [17, 18]. Moreover,
very recently, it has been shown that a variant of MDI-
QKD, the so-called twin-field QKD [19–25], can beat the
private capacity of a point-to-point QKD link [26, 27],
thus offering unprecedented high key rates and achiev-
able distances [6, 28–31].
Nonetheless, MDI-QKD still needs that certain as-
sumptions are satisfied. Precisely, the users (called Alice
and Bob) must characterize their emitted signals accu-
rately, and then incorporate this information in the se-
curity proof. These signals typically deviate from those
prescribed by the ideal protocol due to inevitable device
imperfections, and/or owing to the action of the eaves-
dropper (Eve), who might launch, for instance, a Trojan
Horse attack (THA) [32–34]. If these deviations are not
taken into account, they might open security loopholes,
or so-called side-channels, which could be exploited by
Eve. State preparation flaws (SPFs) can be efficiently
incorporated into the security analysis by means of the
loss-tolerant protocol [5, 35–37]. Also, discrete phase-
randomization has been addressed in [38]. Moreover,
techniques to investigate the problem of information leak-
age about Alice and Bob’s internal settings (due to, say, a
THA) have been introduced in [37, 39, 40]. More recently,
methods to analyze the effect of classical pulse correla-
tions in high-speed QKD have been presented in [41, 42].
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While all these works are remarkable, so far no security
proof has considered all possible side-channels created by
device imperfections in a practical QKD implementation.
In this Letter, we close the gap between theory and
practice in QKD by introducing a simple and practical
MDI-QKD type of protocol for which we prove its se-
curity against any possible device imperfection and/or
side-channel. Furthermore, besides using a much sim-
pler experimental set-up and source characterization with
only one single parameter, we show that the performance
of the protocol is comparable to other MDI-QKD type
of protocols which disregard the effect of several side-
channels.
Protocol description.—For simplicity, in the protocol
description we assume the ideal scenario where there are
no side-channels and all the prepared states are perfect.
The presence of side-channels or SPFs is discussed af-
terwards. That is, the description below represents an
idealized scenario, and, in practice, Alice and Bob do
not necessarily have to generate the states assumed here.
Moreover, we consider the symmetric situation where the
set of transmitted states and their a priori probabilities
are equal for Alice and Bob. Also, we assume that the
untrusted node Charles is located in the middle between
them. We remark, however, that the generalization to
the asymmetric scenario is straightforward [43–48]. The
setup is shown in Fig. 1.
1. Alice (Bob) sends a coherent state |ν〉a (|ω〉b) to the
untrusted node Charles with probability pν (pω),
where ν, ω ∈ T := {α,−α, vac}. The key states |α〉
and |−α〉 are associated with the bit values 0 and
1, respectively, and the vacuum state |vac〉 is used
for parameter estimation.
2. If Charles is honest, he interferes the incoming
pulses in a 50:50 beamsplitter followed by two
threshold detectors, Dc and Dd, which are asso-
ciated with constructive and destructive interfer-
ence, respectively. If his measurement succeeds,
which means that only one of his detectors clicks,
Charles announces the measurement outcome Ω ∈
{Ωc,Ωd}, where Ωc (Ωd) corresponds to a click
event only in detector Dc (Dd). Otherwise, he
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FIG. 1. Graphical illustration of the protocol. In each round,
each of Alice and Bob randomly selects one state from the
set {|α〉 , |−α〉 , |vac〉} and sends it to Charles, who interferes
the incoming signals in a 50:50 beamsplitter followed by two
threshold detectors, Dc and Dd.
announces the failure event. Besides, if Ωd is an-
nounced, Bob flips his bit value.
3. The previous two steps are repeatedN times. Next,
Alice and Bob reveal their state choices for all the
rounds in which at least one of them sent the vac-
uum state. The bits associated with the remaining
rounds declared as successful by Charles constitute
their sifted key.
4. Alice and Bob announce part of their sifted key
and they estimate both the bit and the phase error
rates. Finally, they perform error correction and
privacy amplification to obtain, with high proba-
bility, a secret key.
Side-Channels.—Being a MDI-QKD [16] type of proto-
col, we have that the scheme above is immune against all
detection side-channel attacks, so below we focus only
on the potential side-channels at the transmitters. We
begin by explaining how we describe the emitted states,
and then we move on to the security proof.
For each particular round of the protocol, if Alice and
Bob select, say, the settings ν and ω, respectively, the
joint state of their transmitted systems a and b, and Eve’s
system E, can always be written as
|Ψν,ω〉T =
√
1− ν,ω |φν,ω〉T +
√
ν,ω
∣∣φ⊥ν,ω〉T , (1)
where T := abE, ν,ω ∈ [0, 1], |φν,ω〉T := |ν〉a |ω〉b |τ〉E
with |τ〉E being a state which does not contain any infor-
mation about Alice and Bob’s setting choices for the cur-
rent round, and
∣∣φ⊥ν,ω〉T is a state orthogonal to |φν,ω〉T .
Importantly, as we show below, Eq. (1) represents the
most general description of the transmitted states, which
means that any potential SPF or information leakage
about the internal settings of Alice and Bob can be char-
acterized with that equation. This includes active infor-
mation leakage due to, say, a THA [32, 34, 39, 40, 49],
passive information leakage due to device imperfections,
or both of them simultaneously. Also, it includes classi-
cal pulse correlations, since they can be treated as passive
information leakage [42], as well as coherent attacks. To
see this latter fact, one can consider the purification of
all systems held by Alice, Bob and Eve during the proto-
col. Moreover, we allow all systems held by Eve to jointly
interact with all the optical pulses emitted by Alice and
Bob. Also, we introduce some ancilla systems AA¯ and
BB¯ for Alice and Bob, respectively, that contain all their
setting information in an entanglement-based picture of
the protocol. Here we use the notation x (x¯) to encap-
sulate the systems belonging to the particular round (all
rounds except the particular round) that is being consid-
ered. In doing so, we have that the entire global system
comprises the systems ABabA¯B¯a¯b¯E. Now, if Alice and
Bob perform projective measurements on their ancillas
A and B to obtain their setting information for that par-
ticular round (note that some subsystems within A¯ and
B¯ associated with the previous rounds could have been
already measured), it is straightforward to show that the
resulting state for that round can be written as |Ψν,ω〉T
by simply redefining the joint system A¯B¯a¯b¯E as E.
To explicitly show that Eq. (1) is indeed the
most general description of the transmitted states, let
|ϕ˜ν,ω〉E be an unnormalized state such that |ϕ˜ν,ω〉E =
a〈ν| b〈ω|Ψν,ω〉T . Note that Eq. (1) holds trivially with
ν,ω = 1 if a〈ν| b〈ω|Ψν,ω〉T = 0. Then, |Ψν,ω〉T can al-
ways be written in the following form
|Ψν,ω〉T = |ν〉a |ω〉b |ϕ˜ν,ω〉E + |χ˜ν,ω〉T , (2)
being |χ˜ν,ω〉T another unnormalized state such that
a〈ν| b〈ω|χ˜ν,ω〉T = 0. Similarly, for some ν,ω ∈ [0, 1],
the unnormalized state |ϕ˜ν,ω〉E can always be written as
|ϕ˜ν,ω〉E =
√
1− ν,ω |τ〉E +
∣∣τ˜⊥ν,ω〉E , (3)
where |τ〉E is a normalized state which does not depend
on the internal settings of the transmitters and
∣∣τ˜⊥ν,ω〉E
is an unnormalized state orthogonal to |τ〉E . Finally, by
combining Eqs. (2) and (3), one directly recovers Eq. (1)
with
√
ν,ω
∣∣φ⊥ν,ω〉T = |χ˜ν,ω〉T + |ν〉a |ω〉b ∣∣τ˜⊥ν,ω〉E .
Let us conclude this part by further illustrating the
meaning of Eq. (1) with a simple example. For instance,
suppose a THA where |Ψν,ω〉T = |ν〉a |ω〉b |Λν,ω〉E , being|Λν,ω〉E the state of the back-reflected light which car-
ries information about the transmitters’ settings. The
state |Λν,ω〉E can always be written as a superposition of
the vacuum state and a state
∣∣Λ′ν,ω〉E that contains no
vacuum component, i.e., |Ψν,ω〉T = λ |ν〉a |ω〉b |vac〉E +√
1− λ2 |ν〉a |ω〉b
∣∣Λ′ν,ω〉E . This is so due to inevitable
losses at the transmitters (e.g., produced by material ab-
sorption or due to the presence of optical isolators), which
guarantee λ > 0. This latter equation is equivalent to
Eq. (1) for |τ〉E = |vac〉E .
Security proof.—To prove the security of the protocol
above, we shall assume that Alice and Bob know an upper
bound on ν,ω for each round, but no characterization is
needed for the side-channel states |φ⊥ν,ω〉T in Eq. (1). We
remark, however, that any available information about
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∣∣φ⊥ν,ω〉T could be readily incorporated in the
security proof described below. Also, we emphasize that
the security proof is valid even if the states that Alice
and Bob generate in the ideal scenario (i.e., without side-
channels) are not |ν〉a and |ω〉b, or they are mixed states,
due, for instance, to SPFs. In other words, |ν〉a and |ω〉b
are adopted in Eq. (1) just as a reference for the state
characterization in the experiment.
To calculate a lower bound on the secret key rate of the
protocol, we first need to estimate the phase error rate
eph, which is a key parameter in the complementarity
argument [50]. For this, note that, from Eve’s perspec-
tive, the actual scenario where both Alice and Bob send
Charles key states is equivalently described by a fictitious
scenario where, instead, they first prepare the entangled
state∣∣Ψvir〉
ABT
=
1
2
∑
j,s=0,1
|jz, sz〉AB
∣∣Ψ(−1)jα,(−1)sα〉T , (4)
with {|0z〉 , |1z〉} being the computational basis for the
ancilla systems A and B, and subsequently they send
the system T to Charles. This equivalence holds because
measurements on the ancilla systems A and B commute
with those on the system T . Here, and in what follows,
we shall consider that j, s ∈ {0, 1} when referring to the
virtual states. Now, we can imagine a fictitious virtual
scenario where Alice and Bob measure their ancillas A
and B in the complementary basis {|0x〉 , |1x〉}, being
|jx〉 = 1/
√
2
[|0z〉+ (−1)j |1z〉]. In this virtual scenario,
the unnormalized reduced density operators of the trans-
mitted states are given by
σ¯virj,s = TrAB
[|jx, sx〉〈jx, sx|AB ⊗ 1T ∣∣Ψvir〉〈Ψvir∣∣ABT ] ,
(5)
where 1T is the identity operator acting on T . We call
the states σ¯virj,s the unnormalized virtual states, and we
write their normalized form as σvirj,s ≡
∣∣Ψvirj,s〉〈Ψvirj,s∣∣T .
The phase error rate is then defined as the bit error rate
of the virtual scenario. In the protocol above, a phase er-
ror occurs when Alice and Bob measure either |0x, 0x〉AB
or |1x, 1x〉AB and Charles announces a successful event
(see Appendix A). This means that
eph =
pvir0,0Y
vir
0,0 + p
vir
1,1Y
vir
1,1∑
j,s p
vir
j,sY
vir
j,s
, (6)
where Y virj,s is the conditional probability of a successful
announcement by Charles given that Alice and Bob send
σvirj,s , and p
vir
j,s = Tr{σ¯virj,s}. Note that, since Alice and
Bob measure their ancillas in the complementary basis,
the bit flip operation performed by Bob when Charles
announces a result Ωd has no effect in the virtual sce-
nario. The term
∑
j,s p
vir
j,sY
vir
j,s =: γobs in Eq. (6) is equal
to the probability that Charles announces a successful
event and both Alice and Bob send a key state. This
quantity is directly observed in the actual experiment.
Thus, to calculate eph it is enough to estimate the phase
error probability pvir0,0Y
vir
0,0 + p
vir
1,1Y
vir
1,1 =: Γ.
For this, we use the reference technique recently in-
troduced in [42]. Specifically, we first define, for each
user, a set of qubit states {|Φα〉 , |Φ−α〉 , |Φvac〉} called
the reference states. We have freedom to select the
reference states, however, for the security proof to go
through, a lower bound on |〈Φν,ω|Ψν,ω〉| for each possi-
ble combination of ν and ω is needed, being |Φν,ω〉T :=|Φν〉a ⊗ |Φω〉b ⊗ |τ〉E . That is, the joint reference states|Φν,ω〉T should be chosen similar to the original transmit-
ted states |Ψν,ω〉T , which in practice is equivalent to say
that they should be similar to the states |φν,ω〉T . In what
follows, we will omit the mode subscripts for readability
whenever is clear.
A natural choice for the set of reference states is
given by {|α〉 , |−α〉 , |vac′〉}, where the state |vac′〉 is
the projection of |vac〉 onto the qubit space spanned
by {|α〉 , |−α〉}. For this, let the orthonormal basis
{|0o〉 , |1o〉 , |2o〉} satisfy
|α〉 = |0o〉 ,
|−α〉 = 〈α|−α〉 |0o〉+
√
1− |〈α|−α〉|2 |1o〉 ,
|vac〉 = 〈α|vac〉 |0o〉+ c1 |1o〉+ c2 |2o〉 ,
(7)
where the coefficients c1 and c2 fulfil 〈−α|vac〉 =
〈−α|α〉 〈α|vac〉+c1
√
1− |〈α|−α〉|2 and |〈α|vac〉|2+|c1|2+
c22 = 1, and where, without loss of generality, we assume
that c2 is real. This means, in particular, that |vac′〉 =
1/
√
ξ [〈α|vac〉 |0o〉+ c1 |1o〉], with ξ = |〈α|vac〉|2 + |c1|2.
From the definitions of
∣∣Ψvir〉, σvirj,s , pvirj,s and Y virj,s ,
one can define analogous states and probabilities
∣∣Φvir〉,
σ
vir|ref
j,s , p
vir|ref
j,s and Y
vir|ref
j,s for the reference states above
by simply substituting the actual states |Ψν,ω〉 with
the reference states |Φν,ω〉 where needed in their defi-
nitions [42]. In particular, the yields Y
vir|ref
j,s are defined
as
Y
vir|ref
j,s = Tr
[
Dˆσvir|refj,s
]
, (8)
where Dˆ is the POVM element associated with Charles’
successful announcement. Now, to estimate Γ, one can
define an analogous quantity for the reference states,
namely Γref := p
vir|ref
0,0 Y
vir|ref
0,0 + p
vir|ref
1,1 Y
vir|ref
1,1 , and then
quantify the maximum possible deviation in the mea-
surement statistics between the reference and the actual
scenario. For this, we conveniently define the operator
Dˆph = (|0x, 0x〉〈0x, 0x|+ |1x, 1x〉〈1x, 1x|)⊗Dˆ and then we
use the fact that, for any operator 0  Oˆ  1, and nor-
malized pure states |A〉 and |R〉, the following inequality
is satisfied [42]
δ ≤
√
YAYR +
√
(1− YA)(1− YR), (9)
where δ = |〈A|R〉|, YA = 〈A| Oˆ |A〉 and YR = 〈R| Oˆ |R〉.
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G+(YR, δ) =
{
g+(YR, δ), YR < δ
2
1, otherwise
(10)
G−(YR, δ) =
{
g−(YR, δ), YR > 1− δ2
0, otherwise
(11)
such that G−(YR, δ) ≤ YA ≤ G+(YR, δ), where
g±(Y, δ) = Y + (1− δ2)(1− 2Y )± 2δ
√
(1− δ2)Y (1− Y ).
Furthermore, given Y U ≥ Y and 0 ≤ δL ≤ δ, it holds
that G+(Y
U, δL) ≥ G+(Y, δ). Then, by noticing that
Γ =
〈
Ψvir
∣∣ Dˆph ∣∣Ψvir〉 and Γref = 〈Φvir∣∣ Dˆph ∣∣Φvir〉, an
upper bound on Γ can be simply obtained as
Γ ≤ G+(Γref, δvir)
≤ G+(ΓUref, δLvir) =: ΓU, (12)
where ΓUref is an upper bound on Γref (see Ap-
pendix B for a particular expression) and δLvir =
1/4
∑
j,s=0,1
√
1− (−1)jα,(−1)sα is a lower bound on
δvir :=
∣∣〈Φvir∣∣Ψvir〉∣∣.
Importantly, it can be shown that ΓU can be written
as a concave function of the observed statistics Yν,ω :=
〈Ψν,ω| Dˆ |Ψν,ω〉 and, therefore, the security of the proto-
col can be easily extended against coherent attacks. We
refer the reader to Appendix C for further details.
Finally, given an upper bound eUph = Γ
U/γobs on eph,
the asymptotic secret key rate can be written as
R ≥ Q[1− h(eUph)− feh(ebit)], (13)
where ebit is the bit error rate, fe is the error correction
efficiency and Q is the probability that both Alice and
Bob select a key state and Charles announces a successful
event.
Evaluation.—Fig. 2 shows the secret key rate of the
protocol in the presence of side-channels. For simplicity,
here we set ν,ω =  for all ν, ω ∈ T , and we optimize
the parameter α for each value of the overall system loss.
In our simulations, we model system loss with a beam-
splitter and, also, for simplicity, we disregard any mis-
alignment effect in the channel. In addition, we set the
dark-count probability of Charles’ detectors to pd = 10
−8
to match some recent experiments [29]. Further details
about the channel model and the optimal values for α
can be found in the Appendices A and D.
As expected, the performance of the protocol decreases
when  increases. Also, Fig. 2 shows that, for the chan-
nel model considered, a positive secret key rate is pos-
sible even when  = 10−5. Note that  characterizes,
for each state |Ψν,ω〉, the information leakage of both
users. For instance, when  = 10−6 our simulation re-
sults suggest that Alice and Bob could generate a se-
cret key over about 17.5 dB of overall system loss, which
corresponds to a transmission distance of about 70 km
when considering threshold detectors with 44% of de-
tection efficiency [29] and standard optical fibres with
loss coefficient 0.2 dB/km. If  is sufficiently small, the
FIG. 2. Secret key rate R as a function of the overall system
loss (in dB) between Alice and Bob for different values of
the parameter . For simplicity, we consider the symmetric
scenario where Charles is located in the middle between Alice
and Bob. The value of α has been optimized for each system
loss value.
tolerance of the protocol against the system loss be-
comes comparable to some MDI-QKD protocols which
assume that the transmitted states are characterized pre-
cisely [36, 51]. Also, its key rate is greater than that of the
standard MDI-QKD scheme assuming leaky sources [52],
even though this latter work assumes that there are no
SPFs, Alice and Bob apply perfect phase randomization
and this phase information is not leaked to Eve. More-
over, we remark that this is achieved without requiring
the use of the decoy-state technique [53–55] nor the use of
phase randomized coherent pulses, which could open ad-
ditional side-channels that Eve might exploit [39, 40, 56–
58]. Furthermore, we note that Charles’ station is also
simpler, as it only requires two detectors (rather than
four) to distinguish two Bell states [19, 59].
The simulations in Fig. 2 assume that Alice and Bob
can emit perfect vacuum signals when  = 0 and we con-
sider side-channels attached to the perfect vacuum states
only for simplicity. In practice, however, due to the fi-
nite extinction ratio of intensity modulators, it might be
difficult for them to generate a perfect vacuum state. Im-
portantly, we note that very similar results as those illus-
trated in Fig. 2 can be obtained if Alice and Bob replace
the vacuum signals with sufficiently weak coherent states
(see Appendix E for further details).
Conclusions.—We have presented a simple and practi-
cal MDI-QKD type of protocol which can accommodate
any transmitter imperfections in the security proof, thus
closing the gap between theoretical and implementation
security in QKD. Moreover, it can offer a performance
comparable to other MDI-QKD type of solutions by us-
ing a simpler set-up which only requires the emission of
coherent light pulses and two threshold detectors at the
5intermediate node.
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Appendix A: Channel model
Here we present the expected values for the quantities
Yν,ω used to estimate the phase error rate. For this, we
model the loss from Alice (Bob) to Charles with a beam-
splitter of transmittance
√
η, i.e., the overall system loss
is equal to 10 log(1/η). We further assume, for simplicity,
that Charles’ detectors have the same dark-count prob-
ability pd, and we disregard the effect of phase misalign-
ment introduced by the channel. In this scenario, it can
be shown that the conditional probability that Charles
observes a click in the detector Dc but not in the detector
Dd given that Alice and Bob send him the states |ν〉 and
|ω〉, respectively, is given by
Yν,ω = (1− pd)2e
−√η
(
|ν|2+|ω|2
2 −|ν||ω| cos(φA−φB)
)
×
(
1− e−
√
η
(
|ν|2+|ω|2
2 +|ν||ω| cos(φA−φB)
))
+pd(1− pd), (A1)
where φA = arg(ν) and φB = arg(ω). The same proba-
bility given by Eq. (A1) is valid for the case where Charles
observes destructive interference if one takes into account
the bit flip at Bob’s side (which is equivalent to flipping
the phase of ω). On the other hand, the bit error rate is
given by
ebit =
pd
2pd + e2
√
ηα2 − 1 . (A2)
a. Phase error
Here we sketch how to decide the most convenient def-
inition of a phase error in this protocol. For this, we
assume the ideal scenario without side-channels. This
means that, in the entanglement-based picture, the state
shared by Alice and Bob in the key rounds can be written
as∣∣Ψvir〉 = 1
2
[|0z0z〉AB |α, α〉ab + |0z1z〉AB |α,−α〉ab
+ |1z0z〉AB |−α, α〉ab + |1z1z〉AB |−α,−α〉ab] .
(A3)
The beamsplitter at Charles acts on the input modes a
and b as aˆ† → 1√
2
[cˆ† + dˆ†] and bˆ† → 1√
2
[cˆ† − dˆ†], being
c and d the output modes corresponding to constructive
and destructive interference, respectively, and where mˆ†
denotes the creation operator on mode m. Then, in an
ideal scenario with no loss, the state after the beamss-
pliter can be written as∣∣Ψvir〉 = 1
2
[
|0z0z〉AB |
√
2α〉c + |1z1z〉AB |−
√
2α〉c
]
+
1
2
[
|0z1z〉AB |
√
2α〉d + |1z0z〉AB |−
√
2α〉d
]
.
(A4)
This means that the state associated with a click in Dc
and no click on Dd is given by
|Ψc〉 = e
α2
√
1− e2α2
∞∑
n=1
n odd
[
(
√
2α)n
n!
|n〉c
]
⊗ 1√
2
(|0z0z〉AB − |1z1z〉AB)
+
eα
2
√
1− e2α2
∞∑
n=2
n even
[
(
√
2α)n
n!
|n〉c
]
⊗ 1√
2
(|0z0z〉AB + |1z1z〉AB) , (A5)
where |n〉c is the Fock state with n photons on mode c.
The previous state can be approximated, for α small, to
|Ψc〉 ≈ e
α2α√
1− e2α2 [|0z0z〉AB − |1z1z〉AB ]⊗ |1〉c
=
eα
2
α√
1− e2α2 [|0x1x〉AB + |1x0x〉AB ]⊗ |1〉c .(A6)
Similarly, we can obtain exactly the same result for Dd if
we take into account Bob’s bit flip. This indicates that
a phase error should be defined by Alice and Bob as ob-
serving identical outcomes (i.e., either |0x0x〉 or |1x1x〉)
in the virtual scenario.
Appendix B: Derivation of ΓUref
Here we show how to obtain a simple upper bound on
the quantity Γref. For this, we first relate this quantity to
the probabilities Y
vir|ref
j,s . We do so by rewritting the vir-
7tual states σ
vir|ref
j,s as σ
vir|ref
j,s =
1
4
∑
i,k S
j,s|vir
i,k σ
a
i ⊗ σbk, be-
ing σai and σ
b
k the Pauli operators with i, k ∈ {I, X, Z},
and the terms S
j,s|vir
i,k the Bloch coefficients of the vir-
tual states σ
vir|ref
j,s . Here the Pauli operator σY is not
necessary because none of the states σ
vir|ref
j,s has complex
components. Thus, Eq. (8) can be rewritten as
Y
vir|ref
j,s =
∑
i,k
S
j,s|vir
i,k qi,k, (B1)
where qi,k =
1
4 Tr
[
Dˆσai ⊗ σbk
]
. With this notation, one
can conveniently write the following matrix equation
Γref = (P
vir)TSvirq, (B2)
where (Pvir)T = [p
vir|ref
0,0 , p
vir|ref
1,1 ], S
vir is a 2 × 9 matrix
containing the coefficients S
0,0|vir
i,k (S
1,1|vir
i,k ) in its first
(second) row, and q is a column vector containing the
quantities qi,k. Moreover, and analogously to Eq. (B1),
one can write
Y refν,ω =
∑
i,k
Sν,ωi,k qi,k, (B3)
where Sν,ωi,k denote the Bloch coefficients of the reference
states |Φν,ω〉, and the quantities Y refν,ω are their respective
yields. From Eq. (B3), we find another matrix equation
involving q. It reads
Yref = Sq, (B4)
where Yref is a column vector containing the yields Y refν,ω
and S is a 9× 9 matrix containing the Bloch coefficients
of the reference states |Φν,ω〉 in its rows. Then, by com-
bining Eqs. (B2) and (B4), one obtains
Γref = (P
vir)TSvirS−1Yref = fobjYref , (B5)
where fobj := (P
vir)TSvirS−1 is a row vector. Note that
the matrix S is invertible because it can be written as
the tensor product of two 3× 3 invertible matrices.
Now, to obtain an upper bound on Γref, we bound each
term in Eq. (B5) separately. Specifically, we have that
Γref = fobjY
ref
=
∑
ν,ω
fν,ωY
ref
ν,ω
≤
∑
ν,ω|fν,ω>0
fν,ωG+(Yν,ω, δν,ω)
+
∑
ν,ω|fν,ω<0
fν,ωG−(Yν,ω, δν,ω)
=: ΓUref, (B6)
where the coefficients fν,ω are the elements of the vector
fobj, the observed statistics Yν,ω = 〈Ψν,ω| Dˆ |Ψν,ω〉 and
δν,ω = |〈Ψν,ω|Φν,ω〉|.
Appendix C: Security against coherent attacks
Here we briefly show that the analysis presented in
the main text can be used to guarantee security against
coherent attacks. For this, note that for a protocol with
N rounds, Eq. (12) is still valid for each particular round
n = 1, . . . , N . Also, let us define pK to be the probability
that a round is selected for key generation. That is, this
is the probability that in a successful round none of Alice
and Bob select the vacuum states nor the round is chosen
to estimate the bit error rate or the phase error rate. The
probability pK can be included as a factor on the right
hand side of Eq. (12), so we obtain an upper bound on the
probability that the round n is used for key generation
and a phase error occurs, namely Γ
(n)
K . That is,
Γ
(n)
K = pKΓ
U
n = pKG+
(
ΓUref,n, δ
L
vir
)
, (C1)
where ΓUn (Γ
U
ref,n) is an upper bound on the phase error
probability of the actual (reference) states in the round
n. Then, by using Jensen’s inequality [60], we obtain
1
N
∑
n
Γ
(n)
K =
1
N
∑
n
pKG+
(
ΓUref,n, δ
L
vir
)
≤ pKG+
(
1
N
∑
n
ΓUref,n, δ
L
vir
)
, (C2)
due to the concavity of G+ with respect to its first el-
ement. Now, we can take advantage of the fact that
the function ΓUref given in Eq. (B6) is also concave with
respect to Yν,ω, which for a particular round n we de-
note as Y nν,ω, and apply again Jensen’s inequality, now to
1/N
∑
n Γ
U
ref,n, so we have
81
N
∑
n
ΓUref,n =
1
N
∑
n
∑
ν,ω
fν,ω>0
fν,ωG+
(
Y˜ nν,ω,T
pν,ωpT |ν,ω
, δν,ω
)
+
1
N
∑
n
∑
ν,ω
fν,ω<0
fν,ωG−
(
Y˜ nν,ω,T
pν,ωpT |ν,ω
, δν,ω
)
≤
∑
ν,ω
fν,ω>0
fν,ωG+
( ∑
n Y˜
n
ν,ω,T
Npν,ωpT |ν,ω
, δν,ω
)
+
∑
ν,ω
fν,ω<0
fν,ωG−
( ∑
n Y˜
n
ν,ω,T
Npν,ωpT |ν,ω
, δν,ω
)
, (C3)
where Y˜ nν,ω,T := Y
n
ν,ωpν,ωpT |ν,ω is the joint probability
that Alice and Bob send |Ψν,ω〉, Charles announces a
successful event in the round n, and the round is used
for parameter estimation, pν,ω = pνpω, and pT |ν,ω is the
conditional probability that the round is used for param-
eter estimation given that Alice and Bob send |ν〉 and
|ω〉, respectively. Note that pT |ν,ω = 1 if any of Al-
ice or Bob’s states is the vacuum state. Also, we have
that pK = 1 −
∑
ν,ω pν,ωpT |ν,ω. By combining Eqs.(C2)
and (C3), one arrives to the following bound
∑
n
Γ
(n)
K ≤ NpKG+
 ∑
ν,ω
fν,ω>0
fν,ωG+
( ∑
n Y˜
n
ν,ω,T
Npν,ωpT |ν,ω
, δν,ω
)
+
∑
ν,ω
fν,ω<0
fν,ωG−
( ∑
n Y˜
n
ν,ω,T
Npν,ωpT |ν,ω
, δν,ω
)
, δLvir
 . (C4)
Importantly, the probability Y˜ nν,ω,T could depend on all
the available information up to the n-th round. This
means that, with a negligible probability of failure for
N →∞, one can estimate the sums ∑n Y˜ nν,ω,T from the
observed number of successful events within the param-
eter estimation rounds where Alice and Bob send |Ψν,ω〉,
namely N˜ν,ω,T , by using Azuma’s inequality [61] or
Kato’s inequality [62]. Specifically, N˜ν,ω,T ≈
∑
n Y˜
n
ν,ω,T .
Finally, it is possible to obtain an estimation on
the number of phase errors, N˜ph, from the sum
∑
n Γ
(n)
K
by applying again Azuma’s or Kato’s inequality. That is,
we have that N˜ph ≈
∑
n Γ
(n)
K with negligible probability
of failure when N →∞.
Appendix D: Optimal amplitude α
Here we show in Fig. 3, for completeness, the opti-
mized values of the parameter α corresponding to the
simulations shown in Fig. 2 of the main text.
Appendix E: Non-vacuum intensity
Here we illustrate the effect that the use of imper-
fect vacuum states has on the performance of the pro-
tocol. For this, we consider the secret key rate that Alice
and Bob would obtain when they use the set of states
{|α〉 , |−α〉 , |γ〉}, with γ ∈ R. That is, this set of states
is used in the simulations to calculate the experimental
probabilities Yν,ω as well as to define the set of refer-
ence states {|α〉 , |−α〉 , |γ′〉}, being |γ′〉 the projection of
FIG. 3. Optimal value of α corresponding to the simulations
shown in Fig. 2 in the main text.
|γ〉 onto the qubit space spanned by {|α〉 , |−α〉}. Note,
however, that any |γ|2 > 0 could also be treated as an
imperfection and thus it could be incorporated to the
security proof by properly choosing the parameters ν,ω.
The parameter α is optimized for each value of the overall
system loss, and for illustration purposes we evaluate two
cases for the intensity |γ|2: 0 and 10−5. As one can see
in Fig. 4, the performance is very similar in both cases,
only slightly lower when |γ|2 = 10−5.
9FIG. 4. Comparison between the ideal scenario where the
third reference state |γ〉 used by Alice and Bob is a perfect
vacuum state (|γ|2 = 0) and the case where, instead, such
state is a weak coherent state (|γ|2 = 10−5). As it can be
observed, the performance of the protocol is similar in both
cases.
